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We measure risk aversion and patience in a non-incentivized way using a representative 
sample of the Hungarian adult population. We elicit risk aversion with a task similar to 
Gneezy and Potters (1997)'s investment game and find that females risk about 8.5 % less than 
males when we do not consider any additional controls. However, even when we add 
extensive controls (related to demography, region, family, education, employment, income 
and wealth) the difference decreases only slightly and remains significant at conventional 
levels. We carry out the same exercise for patience and document no significant gender 
differences in any specification. 
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Összefoglaló  
 
A magyar felnőtt lakosság reprezentatív mintáján mérjük a kockázatkerülést és a türelmet 
nem ösztönzött módon. A kockázatkerülést Gneezy és Potters (1997) befektetési játékához 
hasonló feladattal ragadjuk meg és azt találjuk, hogy a nők megközelítőleg 8,5 százalékkal 
kisebb összeget kockáztatnak, mint a férfiak, ha nem veszünk figyelembe egyéb tényezőket. 
Amikor számos (demográfiához, régióhoz, családhoz, végzettséghez, munkavállaláshoz, 
jövedelemhez és vagyonhoz kapcsolódó) kontrollváltozót is felhasználunk, akkor az előző 
különbség csupán enyhén csökken és a szokásos szignifikanciaszintek mellett is jelentős 
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Abstract
We measure risk aversion and patience in a non-incentivized way using a rep-
resentative sample of the Hungarian adult population. We elicit risk aversion
with a task similar to Gneezy and Potters (1997)’s investment game and find
that females risk about 8.5 % less than males when we do not consider any
additional controls. However, even when we add extensive controls (related
to demography, region, family, education, employment, income and wealth)
the difference decreases only slightly and remains significant at conventional
levels. We carry out the same exercise for patience and document no signifi-
cant gender differences in any specification.
Keywords: Gender differences, patience, representative survey, risk
attitude
JEL codes: D8; J16
1. Introduction
The last decades have seen an increasing interest in gender differences in
preferences. Surveys (see Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Bertrand, 2011; Niederle,
2016, and references therein) indicate a significant gender difference in com-
petitive differences (males being more competitive) and risk aversion (females
being more risk averse), though this last result depends on the elicitation
method (see Niederle, 2016, for details). The cited surveys find mixed re-
sults for social preferences. Interestingly, less is known on gender differences
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in time preferences. For instance, none of the previous surveys investigates
this issue and the existing results are mixed.1
We contribute to the literature by analyzing gender differences in risk and
time preferences based on a survey that is representative of the adult popu-
lation of Hungary and that allows the use of a wide array of controls. Our
contribution is twofold. On the one hand, most of the evidence on gender
differences is based on lab experiments, with a generally non-representative
sample of the population (mainly students). Findings on risk attitude from
a representative study furthers our understanding on gender differences in
preferences. On the other hand, there is still no consensus on whether there
is a gender difference in time preferences, thus our finding represents a con-
tribution to this debate.
Falk et al. (2018) use representative samples from 76 countries and also
study gender differences in preferences. After controlling for country and
subnational region fixed effects, they report that women are substantially (by
about 20% of a standard deviation) more risk averse than men. Moreover, in
95% of countries, women exhibit greater risk aversion, the difference being at
least marginally significant in 82% of the cases. Regarding patience, women
are less patient than men, but the difference is small. When investigating
gender differences in patience on country level, in only about two-third of
the countries do the coefficients reveal a greater degree of impatience for
women, and the difference is significant (at least at 10%) in only 32% of the
countries. Our study complements (Falk et al., 2018) in the following ways.
We use an extensive set of controls and are able to assess if gender differences
persist when taking into account a wide array of variables. Moreover, our
risk measurement differs from Falk et al. (2018).
Dohmen et al. (2011) use - among other data sources - a representative
German sample. They show that gender is an important determinant of self-
assessed risk attitude and they also find that answers to such self-assessed
survey correlate strongly with choices in an incentivized experiment on risk
attitude, lending support to the view that unincentivized, but large and
representative surveys are a useful source of information. The study reports
a strong gender difference in the self-assessed risk attitude, female being more
risk averse.
1For instance, Dittrich and Leipold (2014) report that males are more impatient while
Wang et al. (2016) document no gender differences.
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We find a significant gender difference in risk aversion (elicited through a
game resembling the investment game by Gneezy and Potters (1997)) even
after controlling for age, ethnicity, region, settlement type, marital status,
number of children, educational attainment, income, wealth, financial diffi-
culties, and employment type and status. However, we do not see any sig-
nificant gender difference in patience in any specification that we consider.
2. Data and preference measurement
A survey with a sample size of about 1000 individuals aged 18+ is car-
ried out on a quarterly basis by the TA´RKI Social Research Institute. The
survey is based on personal interviews, applies random selection sampling,
and is representative of the Hungarian adult population in terms of gender,
age, educational attainment and settlement type. The survey has a fixed
part, including very extensive data on gender, age, family status and struc-
ture, level of education, labour market status, individual and family incomes,
wealth and financial situation, social status, religiosity. Researchers can add
questions to the survey at a cost.
We introduced questions into the survey of January, 2017. We measured
risk aversion with a simple question, asking how much of 10000 Forints the
individual would place as a bet in a gamble.2 A bag contained 10 black and
10 red balls and one was drawn randomly. The individual could choose a
colour (black or red) and if the colour of the ball drawn coincided with her
chosen colour, then she won the double of the bet she placed. If the colour of
the ball drawn from the bag was different from the chosen colour, then the
bet was lost. We explained also that the amount not placed as a bet would
be given to the individual. We regard the amount placed as bet as a natural
measure of risk attitude. Our measure is very similar to the investment game
of Gneezy and Potters (1997).3
We measured time preferences with 5 questions aiming at finding the
approximate indifference point between an earlier and a later amount of
money. Similarly to Falk et al. (2018) we used interdependent hypothetical
binary choices between 10000 Forints (about 32.26 EUR / 34.48 USD) today
2For details, see section Appendix A in the Supplementary material.
3Charness and Gneezy (2012) report that out of 15 experimental papers using the
investment game 14 find a significant gender difference in risk taking, females being more
risk averse.
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or X Forints in a month. The 10000 Forints remained constant during the 5
questions while the amount X was changed systematically depending on the
previous answers. For instance, if an individual preferred 10000 Forints today
to X=15500 Forints in a month, then it indicated that her indifference point is
higher than 15500 Forints, hence in the next question X was increased. 4 Falk
et al. (2016) show that this method is a valid measure of time preferences.
The difference between the future X Forints and the current 10000 Ft is a
measure of patience as it expresses how much money is needed to compensate
the respondent for having to wait a month. The larger is this amount, the
more impatient an individual is.5
Similarly to Falk et al. (2018), we did not incentivize the tasks.
3. Results
We present our results using coefficient plots. The coefficient plots visu-
alize the estimation of the coefficient with the corresponding standard errors.
We relegate the corresponding OLS regression outputs to section Appendix
B in the Supplementary material.
We estimate various models. The graphs show the female coefficient, or
in other words the female - male differences in risk aversion and in patience.
In the first model we have no additional controls reflecting the raw gender
differences. Then, in later models we add more and more controls. The
second specification has a set of controls that we term exogeneous : age, age
squared and if the interviewer believes that the respondent is of Roma ori-
gin.6 The next set of control variables called region includes dummies for
the NUTS3 regions of Hungary and the type of settlement the respondent
lives in. The fourth set of control variables are related to family and contains
dummies related to the marital status (single, married, separated, living with
partner, widow, divorced) and the number of children of the respondent. We
have also control variables associated with education including dummies if
4Section Appendix A in the Supplementary material contains the whole structure of
the elicitation with the numbers that we used.
5We carried out this time preference elicitation on the 0 vs. 1 month and on the 12
vs. 13 months horizon. Pairwise correlation between choices on the 0-1 and the 12-13
months time horizon is 0.66, significant at even 0.001%. This indicates consistency: those
respondents that are more patient on the shorter horizon, tend to be more patient on the
longer horizon as well.
6It is forbidden by law to ask directly about ethnicity.
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the respondent has a higher than basic education and if the respondent has
a tertiary education degree. The set of control variables related to income
contain information on the income level, on the wealth level (measured by
owning different durables and real estate) and on financial difficulties (hav-
ing experienced problems paying utility bills or repaying mortgages or other
outstanding loans). The last set of control variables is related to employment
and has information on if the respondent works in the private / public sector
and her labour market status (e.g. unemployed, employee, employed, inac-
tive etc.). The sequence in which we presented our sets of control variables
reflects the order as we include them in the regressions. Each new regression
adds a new set of control variables to the ones that appeared in the previous
regressions.
−
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Figure 1: Female-male differences in risk aversion
In Figure 1, on the vertical axis we depict the percentage difference in the
amount that females and males risked in the hypothetical gamble. Negative
values indicate that females risked a lower share of their endowment in the
gamble. We observe that the difference is significant at 5%-level even if we
control for a host of variables, while the gap decreases only slightly from 8.7%
to 6%. This is evidence of a strong gender difference in risk taking using a
representative sample and controling for a wide array of variables.
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Figure 2 follows the same logic as Figure 1. The vertical axis represents
the percentage gender difference in the amount of money needed to com-
pensate for having to wait a month.7 We do not see any significant gender
difference in any of the specifications.
Figure 2: Female-male differences in patience
4. Conclusion
This study contributes to the literature on gender differences in prefer-
ences based on representative samples. In line with the experimental liter-
ature using the Gneezy and Potters (1997)’s investment game and findings
in Falk et al. (2018) based on representative samples from 76 countries we
also document that women are significantly more risk averse than men, even
if we take into account a wide range of controls. Regarding patience, we do
not find any gender differences.
7That is, the average difference in the amounts needed to compensate is divided by
10000.
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Appendix A. Supplementary material - Survey questions
1. During the next questions we will play a short game. You have to
choose between two amounts of money. Not only are the amounts different,
they also differ in when you would receive them. Please assume there is no
inflation, i.e., future prices are the same as today’s prices. This situation is
hypothetical, but please answer as if it was a real choice.
1.a. Would you rather receive 10000 Forints today or X1 in a month?
1 – 10,000 Ft today, or
2 – X1 Ft in a month?
9 – Do not know
(And 4 other questions of this sort followed.)
2. Please assume that you receive 10000 Forints and you have the op-
portunity to place a bet (between 0 and 10000 Ft) on a colour in the next
gamble. There is a bag that contains 10 black and 10 red balls. We will draw
one. If the colour of the ball drawn coincides with your bet, then we double
the amount of your bet. If not, the your bet is lost. The amount not placed
as bet is yours.
Please, select a colour!
2.a Selected colour:
2.b. How much would you bet?
Amount of the bet:
3. Now I will ask similar questions as before, but there is a differ-
ence. You would receive the earlier payoff in a year, and the later payoff
in a year and a month. How would you choose?
3.a. Would you rather receive 10000 Forints in a year or X1 in a year and
a month?
1 – 10,000 Ft today, or
2 – X1 Ft in a month?
9 – DK
(And 4 other questions of this sort followed.)
The staircase method is represented in Figure A.3. First, we asked if the
individual preferred 10000 Forints today or 15500 Forints in a month. The
choice of the former / latter one revealed that the amount of money in a
month that makes the respondent indifferent to 10000 Forints today is more
/ less than 15500 Forints, therefore the next choice involved 10000 Forints
9
today or 18500 / 12500 Forints in a month. We repeated this algorithm in
all the 5 questions.
Figure A.4 shows the patience scores and the corresponding upper and
lower bounds of the indifference point.
We consider the midpoint of the bounds to compute the individual dis-
count rate (IDR). If we denote the midpoint by X, then
(1 + IDR) ∗ 10000 = X, (A.1)
and therefore
IDR = (X/10000) − 1. (A.2)
The corresponding individual discount rates are shown in the last column
of Figure A.4.
10
Figure A.3: Tree for the staircase time preference task
11
Figure A.4: Patience scores, the corresponding upper and lower bounds of the indifference
point and the implied individual discount rates
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Appendix B. Supplementary material - OLS regressions
This section contains the regressions related to risk aversion and patience.
Here we present the complete regression outputs of the different specifica-
tions.
The female dummy captures the difference is risk attitudes as the dif-
ference in the amount that the individuals placed as a bet. Age and age2
indicates the effects related to age. Roma is a dummy with value of 1 if the
interviewer believes that the respondent is of Roma origin. These variables
are called exogeneous in Figure 1.
The next set of variables are termed region. These include six dummies for
the NUTS3 regions of Hungary, the baseline region being Central Hungary.
Settlement type also belongs to this set of variables. It contains 3 dummy
variables (town, city, Budapest), the baseline being village.
The set of variables called family has two components: marital status
and number of children. Marital status is a set of dummy variables (married,
separated, living with partner, widow, divorced), the baseline variable being
single. We also account for the fact if marital status is missing. Using dummy
variables we also take into account the number of children, the baseline being
if the respondent has no children.
The control for education uses two dummy variables: the dummy low
education level equals 1 if the maximum educational attainment of the re-
spondent is having finished only the primary school. On the contrary, the
binary variable high education level takes on the value of 1 if the respondent
has at least a tertiary degree.
The next set of control variables termed income attempts to give a fair
picture about the respondent’s financial situation. Therefore, it considers the
income and the wealth (using an index based on wealth items and durables
that the respondent possesses), also allowing for the fact if some of these
informations are missing. Moreover, we form also a financial difficulties index
that indicates if in the preceding year the respondent had any problem paying
utility bills or outstanding loans.
Regarding employment, first we consider if the respondent works in the
public sector or not. We also take into account the employment status of
the respondent by using dummies (employee, unemployed, retired, inactive,
student, other), the baseline being self-employed.
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Appendix B.1. Risk aversion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Female -8.676∗∗∗ -7.691∗∗∗ -8.524∗∗∗ -7.881∗∗∗ -8.098∗∗∗ -6.228∗∗ -6.046∗
(2.319) (2.292) (2.221) (2.230) (2.230) (2.316) (2.372)
Age 0.409 0.350 0.538 0.497 0.395 0.494
(0.430) (0.415) (0.476) (0.480) (0.483) (0.533)
Age2 -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 -0.005 -0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Roma -1.951 2.884 4.321 5.416 6.492 6.954
(5.022) (4.731) (4.971) (5.042) (5.184) (5.063)
Region=Central Transdanubia -0.529 -0.918 -0.985 -3.612 -3.730
(4.651) (4.713) (4.692) (4.968) (5.047)
Region=Western Transdanubia -2.245 -2.667 -2.542 -4.323 -4.849
(5.396) (5.458) (5.480) (5.636) (5.677)
Region=Southern Transdanubia -23.711∗∗∗ -24.585∗∗∗ -24.801∗∗∗ -24.520∗∗∗ -24.807∗∗∗
(4.712) (4.745) (4.741) (4.728) (4.832)
Region=Northern Hungary -20.712∗∗∗ -20.963∗∗∗ -21.002∗∗∗ -21.836∗∗∗ -21.881∗∗∗
(4.677) (4.767) (4.797) (4.861) (4.900)
Region=Northern Great Plain -18.108∗∗∗ -18.305∗∗∗ -18.204∗∗∗ -18.700∗∗∗ -19.003∗∗∗
(4.514) (4.562) (4.589) (4.817) (4.849)
Region=Southern Great Plain -12.873∗∗ -13.084∗∗ -13.103∗∗ -13.392∗∗ -13.090∗
(4.615) (4.773) (4.780) (5.036) (5.091)
Settl.type=town 5.492∗ 5.307∗ 4.880 5.732∗ 6.155∗
(2.566) (2.568) (2.570) (2.568) (2.588)
Settl.type=city 10.838∗∗ 10.804∗∗ 10.058∗∗ 10.736∗∗ 10.932∗∗
(3.331) (3.375) (3.419) (3.459) (3.486)
Settl.type=Budapest -4.603 -4.807 -6.090 -8.322 -8.465
(4.821) (4.871) (4.896) (5.076) (5.081)
Married -1.411 -1.397 -0.196 -0.222
(4.229) (4.220) (4.280) (4.343)
Separated 2.953 1.860 5.026 3.656
(9.983) (9.759) (10.000) (9.825)
Living w/ partner 1.257 1.468 1.978 2.013
(5.421) (5.410) (5.530) (5.527)
Widow -6.158 -5.900 -5.190 -5.401
(5.045) (5.054) (5.108) (5.116)
Divorced -1.917 -1.833 -0.578 -1.215
(4.562) (4.557) (4.635) (4.661)
Marital status missing -3.313 -3.597 -4.750 -3.231
(24.077) (23.545) (21.372) (22.083)
Nr. children: 1 -7.333∗ -7.314∗ -9.139∗ -9.044∗
(3.644) (3.625) (3.639) (3.645)
Nr. children: 2 -0.179 -0.277 -1.635 -1.674
(3.642) (3.639) (3.617) (3.572)
Nr. children: 3 -6.741 -6.607 -7.388 -7.890
(4.159) (4.180) (4.079) (4.156)
Nr. children: 4 -3.079 -3.466 -4.115 -4.436
(7.783) (7.873) (7.779) (7.537)
Nr. children: 5+ -6.877 -6.779 -9.053 -10.207
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(10.436) (10.464) (10.887) (10.126)
Low education level -1.531 -0.346 -0.376
(2.614) (2.711) (2.716)
High education level 3.032 1.357 0.439
(3.416) (3.472) (3.691)
21K HUF < income < 40K HUF -16.735 -17.389
(17.090) (16.506)
41K HUF < income < 70K HUF -8.164 -5.344
(17.075) (16.704)
71K HUF < income < 100K HUF -10.716 -7.275
(16.747) (16.539)
101K HUF < income < 150K HUF -6.393 -2.678
(16.724) (16.485)
151K HUF < income < 200K HUF -1.758 2.165
(17.067) (16.793)
201K HUF < income < 300K HUF 5.063 9.039
(17.499) (17.335)
301K HUF < income < 500K HUF 15.591 18.465
(20.669) (20.250)
Income missing -10.233 -6.736
(16.710) (16.350)
Wealth index -0.444 -0.625
(2.032) (2.040)
Wealth missing 5.390 4.785
(6.765) (6.965)
Fin. difficulties index 0.685 0.495
(1.484) (1.455)
Works in public sector 2.084
(4.848)
Other -1.249
(4.633)
Works in public s. missing -10.429
(8.882)
Employee 6.119
(5.985)
Unemployed 9.478
(6.720)
Retired -0.710
(3.856)
Inactive 2.390
(5.935)
Student 14.890
(10.862)
Other -3.027
(8.834)
Constant 43.194∗∗∗ 41.523∗∗∗ 49.378∗∗∗ 46.157∗∗∗ 47.498∗∗∗ 55.562∗∗ 48.824∗
(1.847) (10.735) (11.338) (12.130) (12.110) (19.668) (21.968)
Observations 932 932 932 932 932 932 932
Adjusted R2 0.017 0.039 0.107 0.110 0.110 0.119 0.117
AIC 9102.941 9084.934 9025.064 9033.237 9034.769 9036.461 9046.819
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Appendix B.2. Patience
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
delta delta delta delta delta delta delta
Female -0.001 0.000 -0.002 0.002 0.000 -0.003 -0.002
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Age -0.001 -0.001 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Age2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Roma -0.073∗∗ -0.052 -0.056∗ -0.044 -0.048 -0.040
(0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028)
Region=Central Transdanubia 0.083∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗ 0.073∗∗
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023)
Region=Western Transdanubia 0.107∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022)
Region=Southern Transdanubia 0.023 0.023 0.021 0.016 0.027
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Region=Northern Hungary -0.009 -0.008 -0.008 -0.019 -0.018
(0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Region=Northern Great Plain 0.042 0.042 0.044 0.031 0.036
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.024)
Region=Southern Great Plain 0.044 0.046∗ 0.046∗ 0.036 0.044
(0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024)
Settl.type=town -0.021 -0.021 -0.025 -0.025 -0.023
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Settl.type=city -0.009 -0.013 -0.020 -0.017 -0.022
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Settl.type=Budapest 0.052∗ 0.052∗ 0.040 0.032 0.038
(0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Married 0.032 0.034 0.034 0.030
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Separated -0.037 -0.044 -0.036 -0.035
(0.051) (0.053) (0.052) (0.050)
Living w/ partner 0.050∗ 0.052∗ 0.053∗ 0.055∗
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Widow -0.020 -0.016 -0.011 -0.018
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Divorced 0.043 0.044 0.049∗ 0.046
(0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024)
Marital status missing 0.093 0.089 0.083 0.104
(0.050) (0.050) (0.058) (0.063)
Nr. children: 1 -0.005 -0.007 -0.009 -0.009
(0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Nr. children: 2 0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.003
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Nr. children: 3 -0.013 -0.011 -0.009 -0.017
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Nr. children: 4 0.024 0.023 0.030 0.044
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(0.046) (0.046) (0.044) (0.039)
Nr. children: 5+ -0.011 -0.010 -0.008 -0.005
(0.058) (0.057) (0.057) (0.065)
Low education level -0.027∗ -0.027 -0.025
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
High education level 0.010 0.014 0.015
(0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
21K HUF < income < 40K HUF 0.060 0.067
(0.086) (0.094)
41K HUF < income < 70K HUF 0.015 0.035
(0.083) (0.091)
71K HUF < income < 100K HUF 0.048 0.075
(0.081) (0.089)
101K HUF < income < 150K HUF 0.027 0.061
(0.080) (0.089)
151K HUF < income < 200K HUF 0.012 0.048
(0.082) (0.090)
201K HUF < income < 300K HUF 0.009 0.045
(0.085) (0.093)
301K HUF < income < 500K HUF 0.037 0.077
(0.096) (0.102)
Income missing 0.001 0.032
(0.080) (0.088)
Wealth index 0.008 0.007
(0.010) (0.010)
Wealth missing 0.014 0.004
(0.030) (0.029)
Fin. difficulties index -0.004 -0.004
(0.007) (0.007)
Works in public sector -0.016
(0.025)
Other -0.009
(0.023)
Works in public s. missing -0.146∗
(0.073)
Employee -0.006
(0.027)
Unemployed 0.053∗
(0.026)
Retired 0.028
(0.021)
Inactive 0.041
(0.029)
Student 0.195∗∗
(0.073)
Other 0.057
(0.056)
Constant 0.806∗∗∗ 0.859∗∗∗ 0.816∗∗∗ 0.850∗∗∗ 0.867∗∗∗ 0.859∗∗∗ 0.789∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.049) (0.052) (0.056) (0.057) (0.091) (0.111)
Observations 955 955 955 955 955 955 955
Adjusted R2 -0.001 0.010 0.050 0.061 0.067 0.066 0.074
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AIC -759.895 -767.580 -798.385 -798.343 -802.407 -791.178 -790.470
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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